On the evening of January 27, 1986, 34 engineers from the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and Morton Thiokol Corporation in Utah held a teleconference to discuss whether, in view of the forecast for temperatures in the low 20s at Cape Canaveral during the early morning of January 28, the launch of Space Shuttle Challenger, which was scheduled for January 28, should be postponed. The engineers were concerned that O-rings in the joints between sections of the solid rocket boosters manufactured by Thiokol would not seal properly in temperatures that low. Thiokol Vice President of Engineering Robert Lund gave the Thiokol engineering recommendation: The shuttle should not launch if the O-ring temperature was less than 53 degrees Fahrenheit.
This was the "Teacher in Space" mission. The original launch date of January 22, 1986 had been postponed repeatedly because of seven delays totaling 25 days in launch of the Space Shuttle Columbia, which finally took off on January 12, 1986. The "Teacher in Space" mission was a high-profile mission. The repeated delays of the Columbia launch had embarrassed NASA. NASA management wanted to launch Challenger on time.
NASA managers reacted adversely to the Thiokol recommendation, and Thiokol management asked for five minutes for a Thiokol-only caucus. Thiokol Senior Vice President Jerry Mason told that caucus, "We have to make a management decision." Mason asked Lund (who had presented the engineering recommendation against launch) to "take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat." Thiokol managers, including Lund, voted to recommend launching the Challenger.
The late Richard Feynman concludes his excellent discussion of the ensuing disaster with the following words: "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
Only seven people rode the Challenger on its last flight. We all ride spaceship Earth. If someone makes a "management" (or "political") decision to call a law the "Clear Skies Act," but the law allows more pollutants to be emitted into the atmosphere, the atmosphere will be dirtier. If someone makes a management or political decision to suppress information on mercury emissions, he will not thereby change mercury from poison into baby food. If, for political purposes, someone manipulates information on gobal temperature trends, he will not thereby affect actual global temperatures.
In March, the Union of Concerned Scientists published a report, "Scientific Integrity in Policymaking, An Investigation Into The Bush Administration's Misuse of Science." The report says the Bush administration suppresses or misrepresents science that might undercut the adminstration's political goals. In April, the administration's Office of Science and Technology Policy responded, denying the charges. Shortly thereafter, the UCS issued a reply. Some of the report by the UCS is convincing; some is sloppy. Some of the administration's answer is articulate, but some of the UCS charges go essentially unanswered.
It was easy to see that someone had made a mistake in clearing the Challenger for launch. But if a law is falsely called the "Clear Skies Act," the atmosphere will not instantly burst into flame, incinerating those who lied as well as those who listened, and alerting the survivors to the fact that somthing is wrong. However, slowly and inexorably, nature will hold us accountable for our acts and omissions.
The Bush administration is entitled to its views about religion, morality, and even the proper way to conduct foreign policy. If, some day, those views attract the votes of a majority of the electorate, then the administration can claim some legitimacy in imposing them on the nation. But an administration that practices deceit or suppression regarding scientific investigations can claim no legitimacy for policies that depend on, or that might be undercut by, such investigations.
[Note: The description of the Challenger launch decision is based principally upon Chapter One of "The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA," by Diane Vaughan, published in 1996 by the University of Chicago Press.]
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