In what appears to be the first draft of an essay that the Wall Street Journal nonetheless published on September 11, 2009, Fouad Ajami asserts that the "distinction between a war of choice (Iraq) and a war of necessity (Aghanistan) . . . is both morally false and intellectually muddled." The war in Iraq, he asserts, was a war of necessity. Actually, he does not quite say that it was necessary for the United States to make war on and in Iraq. What was necessary was that in response to the 9/11 attack, the United States attack "the Arab world." Iraq was the place where this attack was staged, he says, because Saddam Hussein "had drawn the short straw."
When something disagreeable must be done, and no one in the group of people who potentially may do it wants to do it, one way to pick the person to do it is to procure a number of straws of the same length, cut one of them so that it is shorter than the rest, and have one of the group--or, for that matter, a neutral party--hold them in his hand so that one end of each straw is visible, but it is not possible to see which is the short straw. Each person in the group then draws one straw, and the one who draws the short straw has to do the dirty deed. To say that Saddam Hussein drew the short straw is to say that he was chosen at random from among a group. To some, this seems a fair description of the Bush administration's decision making process. However, Ajami contradicts himself in the very next sentence of his essay.
Saddam, he says, "had been brazen and defiant at a time of genuine American concern, and a lesson was made of him." So, the choice of Iraq as the site of American retaliation against Arabs was not totally random. Saddam was chosen because he was an uppity Arab.
What exactly was the lesson that was made of Saddam Hussein? Ajami explains, "The decapitation of his regime was a cautionary tale for his Arab brethren." George W. Bush "drew a line when the world of Arabs was truly in the wind and played upon by powerful temptations."
Want a more specific explication of the lesson the Arabs are to learn from the American invasion of Iraq? Tough luck. Ajami switches topics--he goes back to the other "war of necessity," Afghanistan.
Before we also switch topics, let us reflect briefly on the lessons of Iraq for those other uppity Arabs, Osama bin Laden and wannabe Osamas. The first lesson is: You can attack the United States and get away with it. Osama was never caught. Soon after 9/11 (the day after, according to some accounts), the United States turned its attention to a bigger, easier target.
The second lesson is, Not only can you get away with attacking the United States, you can get exactly the reaction from the United States that you want. What does a terrorist want to cause? Terror. Certainly, an Arab who noticed that an attack on the United States by a bunch of Saudis operating out of Afghanistan provoked an attack on Iraq could conclude that the United States was simply looking for an excuse to attack Arabs, and that the United States is the enemy of all Arabs. Could Osama bin Laden ask for more?
Meanwhile, back to Afghanistan. Ajami seems to agree that Afghanistan is a war of necessity. But is it? Certainly it was eight years ago. The 911 attacks originated there. Osama bin Laden was there. Osama's protectors, the Taliban, were there. Osama is gone. The United States has given Afghanistan its shot at elections and Western-style government. What is left? Ajami writes that Obama "fears failure in Afghanistan, and nothing more." Is this not a perfectly rational approach to Afghanistan? There is nothing for the United States to gain in Afghanistan. The United States can't catch Osama there--he's long gone. With Osama gone, Afghanistan has nothing that the United States wants. What the United States wants is not to fail. What the United States wants is not to have Afghanistan revert to a failed state dominated by a heroin-financed Taliban. What the United States wants is not to have eastern Afghanistan turn once again into a sanctuary for al Qaeda terrorists. The only interest the United States now has in Afghanistan is not to fail. A policy directed toward the goal of not failing is a correct one.